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Abstract 
This research examined the link between attachment styles and belief in 
conspiracy theories.  It was hypothesized, due to the tendency to exaggerate the 
intensity of threats, that higher anxiously attached individuals would be more likely to 
hold conspiracy beliefs, even when accounting for other variables such as right-wing 
authoritarianism, interpersonal trust, and demographic factors that have been found to 
predict conspiracy belief in previous research.  In Study 1 (N = 246 Amazon 
Mechanical Turk workers), participants higher in anxious attachment style showed a 
greater tendency to believe in conspiracy theories.  Further, this relationship remained 
significant when accounting for other known predictors of conspiracy belief.  Study 2 
(N = 230 Prolific Academic workers) revealed that anxious attachment again predicted 
the general tendency to believe conspiracy theories, but also belief in specific 
conspiracy theories and conspiracy theories about groups.  These relationships held 
when controlling for demographic factors.  The current studies add to the body of 
research investigating the individual differences predictors of conspiracy belief, 
demonstrating that conspiracy belief may, to some degree, have roots in early childhood 
experiences.  
 
Keywords:  conspiracy belief, attachment, anxious, security, threat 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Belief in conspiracy theories  
Conspiracy theories attribute significant social and political events to the actions 
of powerful and malicious groups (Goertzel, 1994; Douglas & Sutton, 2008, Uscinski & 
Parent, 2014).  For example, popular conspiracy theories propose that the 9/11 attacks 
on the TwLQ7RZHUVZHUHDQµLQVLGHMRE¶orchestrated by the Bush administration, and 
that Diana, Princess of Wales was assassinated by the British Secret Service.  
Conspiracy theories like these are popular (Oliver & Wood, 2014) and research 
suggests that if an individual believes in one conspiracy theory they are likely to believe 
others (Goertzel, 1994; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010), even when 
those theories directly contradict each other (Wood, Douglas & Sutton, 2012).  Belief in 
conspiracy theories also has important consequences, such as reducing levels of civic 
engagement (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a), commitment to important preventative health 
treatments (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b), and loyalty to the workplace (Douglas & Leite, 
2017).  It is therefore important to understand the factors that draw individuals toward 
conspiracy theories.  To meet this aim, the current research adds to a growing body of 
literature examining the individual differences predictors of belief in conspiracy 
theories.  Specifically, we focus on the association between conspiracy belief and 
attachment style, arguing that the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories may 
originate²to some extent²in early childhood experiences.  
Douglas, Sutton and Cichocka (2017) reason that conspiracy theories are 
appealing to individuals because they appear to satisfy three types of psychological 
needs: social (e.g., the need to maintain positive image of oneself or RQH¶Vgroup), 
epistemic (e.g., the need to be certain, consistent, and accurate), and existential (e.g., the 
need for security and control).  For example, conspiracy theories seem to be more 
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appealing to individuals who feel that their personal image is being threatened 
(Cichocka, Marchlewska & Golec de Zavala, 2016) and those who have a high personal 
need for uniqueness (Lantian, Muller, Nurra & Douglas, 2017), which may appear to 
satisfy the social need to maintain positive self-esteem.  Conspiracy theories also seem 
to appeal to individuals who seek patterns and order in their environment (van Prooijen, 
Douglas & de Inocencio, in press), or those with lower levels of education (Douglas, 
Sutton, Callan, Dawtry & Harvey, 2016), which may appear to satisfy the epistemic 
need for accuracy and certainty.  Finally, research suggests that individuals who feel 
disempowered (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan & Gregory, 1999) and anxious (Grzesiak-
Feldman, 2013) are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, which may appear to 
satisfy the existential need for security and control.  Whether conspiracy theories 
successfully address these needs is unclear, and the research to date suggests that they 
might not.  For instance, some research suggests that conspiracy theories increase 
(rather than decrease) feelings of powerlessness (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a).  
Nevertheless, people appear to be attracted to conspiracy theories when these needs are 
unfulfilled (Douglas et al., 2017). 
3HRSOH¶Vexistential needs in particular are the focus of the current research.  
People are motivated to perceive their environment as safe and reassuring (Jost & 
+XQ\DG\5RWKEDXP:HLV]DQG6Q\GHUSURSRVHGWKDWWKUHDWVWRRQH¶V
security and perceived sense of control over the environment (e.g., terrorist attacks), 
lead people to attempt to restore compensatory control at a more symbolic level, such as 
feeling that they possess unique knowledge of the concerning threat (i.e., knowing the 
µWUXWK¶; see also Deci and Ryan (1985) for a discussion of compensatory control 
mechanisms that people might adopt when needs are thwarted).  Douglas et al (2017) 
argue that belief in conspiracy theories may be one way in which people seek such 
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compensatory control.  Experimental research supports this view, showing that when 
people were reminded of a time when they had no control, endorsement of conspiracy 
theories increased, whereas belief decreased when a sense of control was induced (van 
Prooijen & Acker, 2015).  Further, Sullivan, Landau and Rothschild (2010) found that 
threats to personal control increased the perceived conspiratorial power of an enemy.  
There is some evidence, therefore, that people turn to conspiracy theories in an attempt 
to relieve particular concerns related to security and control. 
1.2. Attachment style  
The origins of such concerns can be considered through the lens of attachment 
theory.  Pioneered by Bowlby (1969/1982) attachment theory proposes that infants are 
biologically driven to seek proximity to a primary caregiver when feeling distressed or 
threatened²termed tKH³DWWDFKPHQWbehavioral V\VWHP´7KHSULPDU\JRDORI
attachment behavior is to alleviate feelings of anxiety and to elicit a sense of security 
(Sroufe & Waters, 1977).  Bowlby argued that early experiences of threats to security 
create an internal working model consisting of expectations, emotions, and behavioral 
strategies elicited by threatening stimuli.  He further argued that threatening stimuli 
later in life activate these working models.   
Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall (1978) found evidence for three types of 
working attachment models in infants that result from interactions with primary 
caregivers.  These are secure attachment, which is the result of consistent emotional 
physical responsiveness, anxious attachment, which is the result of inconsistent 
emotional and physical responsiveness, and avoidant attachment, which is the result of 
consistent emotional and psychical unavailability.  Attachment styles are not simply the 
product of attachment experiences in infancy, but are also relevant during adulthood 
(Sroufe, Egeland, Carlson, & Collins, 2009).  Brennan, Clark, and Shaver (1998) found 
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that adult attachment styles can be understood by two fundamental dimensions.  These 
are attachment anxiety, or a heightened state of arousal and preoccupation with close 
relationships, and attachment avoidance characterized by discomfort in close 
relationships, and emotional distancing.  Furthermore, low anxiety and low avoidance 
constitute a secure attachment style, high anxiety and low avoidance constitute an 
anxious attachment style, and low anxiety and high avoidance constitute an avoidant 
attachment style. 
Integrating the theoretical perspectives of attachment theorists (e.g., Ainsworth, 
1991; Bowlby, 1969/1982; Cassidy & Kobak, 1988; Main, 1995), Mikulincer and 
Shaver (2003) developed a model of attachment-system functioning in adulthood.  They 
argued that the activation of the attachment-system depends upon the occurrence of a 
threat (actual or perceived), how the threat is appraised, and the attachment style of the 
concerning individual.  Once the attachment system is activated, individuals are 
motivated to seek proximity to external or internalized (mental representations) 
attachment figures.  If successful, security-based strategies can be employed and 
feelings of security, relief and positive affect can be attained.  However, if external or 
internalized attachment figures are not available or are inconsistently available, then the 
threat is compounded and secondary strategies (hyperactivating and deactivating) are 
employed to alleviate feelings of distress (Cassidy & Kobak, 1988).  Main (1990) likens 
these two secondary strategies to the distinction between fight and flight, in that 
hyperactivating strategies²fight responses²include increased effort to seek proximity 
to significant others, whereas deactivating strategies²flight responses²emphasise a 
decreased effort to seek proximity to significant others. 
Individuals with a secure attachment have a history of successful interactions 
with available and responsive attachment figures, which then increases the likelihood of 
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security-based strategies being employed to alleviate feelings of distress (Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2007).  For example, research has shown that individuals with secure (vs. 
insecure) attachment have a greater tendency to seek instrumental and emotional 
support from significant others and professional sources such as teachers and 
counselors (Florian, Mikulincer, & Bucholtz, 1995; Larose, Bernier, Soucy, & 
Duchesne, 1999).  Avoidant attachment is the result of emotional and psychical 
unavailability of attachment figures.  Therefore proximity seeking is not a viable option 
for avoidant individuals, so in threatening times they tend to alleviate distress by 
deactivating the attachment system (Cassidy & Kobak, 1988).  For example, individuals 
with avoidant attachment have been shown to adopt distancing coping strategies, such 
as diversion of attention, stress denial, and cognitive and behavioral disengagement 
(Feeney & Ryan, 1994; Lopez, Mauricio, Gormley, Simko, & Berger, 2001; Shapiro & 
Levendosky, 1999).  Furthermore, avoidant individuals tend to deny thoughts or 
feelings that imply vulnerability or dependence (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007).   
Anxiously attached individuals have a history of inconsistent responsiveness 
from attachment figures, but nevertheless have strong desire for proximity (Mikulincer 
& Shaver, 2007).  To gain an attachment figure¶s support, attention, and care in times of 
need, anxiously attached individuals tend to employ hyperactivating strategies (Cassidy 
& Kobak, 1988).  For example, they tend to exaggerate the seriousness of threats they 
are facing, in the hope that this will gain them the support, attention and care they desire 
(Cassidy & Berlin, 1994; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).  This coping strategy appears 
not to be a fruitful one.  Overall, Girme, Lemay, and Hammond (2014) found that 
individuals with anxious attachment tend to exaggerate expressions of hurt when their 
relationship is threatened, with the aim of inducing guilt in their partner to gain a 
reassuring reaction.  The benefit of attaining some reassurance also comes with the cost 
ATTACHMENT AND CONSPIRACY BELIEF      8 
 
of a significant decrease in relationship satisfaction.  Mikulincer and Florian (2000) 
argued that this tendency to exaggerate can account for why anxiously attached 
individuals are more sensitive to threats.  We argue that this exaggeration may also 
manifest itself in increased conspiracy belief.   
1.3. Anxious attachment and conspiracy belief 
Recent theorizing in social psychology suggests that individuals use conspiracy 
theories as an attempted defensive mechanism to address psychological needs, 
including the existential need for security and control (Douglas et al., 2017).  
Individuals with anxious attachment are preoccupied with their security, tend to hold a 
negative view of outgroups, are more sensitive to threats, and tend to exaggerate the 
seriousness of such threats.  Secure and avoidant attachment styles, on the other hand, 
are less sensitive to threats and do not exaggerate such threats.  Anxious attachment²
compared to secure and avoidant attachment²could therefore potentially be a key 
predictor of conspiracy belief.   
Several studies provide indirect evidence for this relationship.  For example, 
insecure attachment has generally been shown to predict greater endorsement of right-
wing attitudes (for a review see Koleva & Rip, 2009).  Furthermore, dispositional and 
primed attachment security has been found to buffer the effects of existential threats 
and is associated with decreased endorsement of right-wing attitudes and policies 
(Weise et al., 2008).  Lastly, insecure attachment and interpersonal trust are intimately 
connected.  Much of the literature has revealed that individuals with anxious or 
avoidant attachment style tend to be low in interpersonal trust (Luke, Maio, & 
Carnelley, 2004; Cozzarelli, Hoekstra, and Bylsma, 2000).  Considering that anxious 
attachment predicts low interpersonal trust and increased perceptions of the world as 
threatening and dangerous, then perhaps endorsement of conspiracy explanations is one 
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way to gain a compensatory feeling of control in an otherwise threatening world filled 
with untrustworthy others. 
Recent research has provided more direct evidence of the relationship between 
anxious attachment and conspiracy belief.  In a large epidemiological study, Freeman 
and Bentall (2017) found that conspiracy belief positively correlated with both anxious 
and avoidant²but not secure²attachment styles.  However, this study used a single-
item measure of conspiracy belief and such items are typically vulnerable to random 
measurement error (Schmidt & Hunter, 1996).  Freeman and Bentall (2017) also used a 
single item measure for secure, anxious and avoidant attachment, but attachment styles 
are more accurately measured using two dimensions of attachment²anxious and 
avoidant (Brennan & Shaver, 1995; Sandford, 1997)²where low scores on both 
anxious and avoidant attachment are considered to represent a secure attachment style.  
High scores (and low on the other) on either dimension are considered an anxious and 
avoidant attachment style.  Furthermore, Freeman and Bentall (2017) did not attempt to 
separate the relative contributions of anxious and avoidant attachment style to 
conspiracy belief, nor did they control for other factors that have been found to be 
associated with attachment and conspiracy belief in previous research.   
The current research therefore aimed to test the extent to which the different 
attachment styles contribute to conspiracy belief whilst taking each other into account 
and controlling for other known predictors of conspiracy belief.  Based on the literature 
reviewed above, and the tendency for anxiously attached individuals to be sensitive to, 
and exaggerate threats, we anticipate that anxious attachment will be a stronger 
predictor of conspiracy belief than avoidant or secure attachment.  
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1.4. The present research 
We conducted two studies to examine the relationship between attachment and 
conspiracy belief.  In Study 1 we also controlled for right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; 
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sandford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1981) and social 
dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999), which have both been shown to predict conspiracy belief in previous 
research (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 
2013; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015) and are associated with perceptions of threat (Duckitt, 
2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 
2013).  We also controlled for the extent to which people view the world as a battle 
between good and evil.  This Manichean worldview is associated with belief in 
conspiracy theories (Oliver & Wood, 2014) and arguably centres around the notion of 
threat from others (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).  We further controlled for individual 
differences in interpersonal trust, which are consistently associated with conspiracy 
belief (e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994) and arguably impede feelings 
of security and control.  Finally, we also considered the contribution of demographic 
variables (specifically age, education level, and religiosity), which have all been found 
to predict conspiracy belief in previous research (Douglas et al., 2016).  
 In Study 2 we again measured the relationship between attachment and 
conspiracy belief, this time including two additional dependent measures²belief in 
specific conspiracy theories and belief in conspiracy theories about groups.  We did so 
to examine whether attachment predicts a general tendency to believe notions of 
conspiracy or also more specific conspiracy theories. Finally, we again considered the 
contribution of age, education level, and religiosity. 
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Due to heightened threat sensitivity, and the tendency to exaggerate the 
seriousness of such threats, we hypothesized that anxious attachment would predict 
belief in conspiracy theories, even when accounting for other established predictors of 
conspiracy belief.  The pattern of regression coefficients allows us to test this 
hypothesis.  Specifically, if anxious attachment predicts conspiracy belief as 
hypothesized, then the beta weight for the relationship between anxious attachment and 
conspiracy belief should be positive, whereas the beta weight for the relationship 
between avoidant attachment and conspiracy belief should be negative or non-
significant.  If avoidant attachment style predicts conspiracy belief then the beta weight 
for the relationship between avoidant attachment style and conspiracy belief should be 
positive whereas the relationship between anxious attachment style and conspiracy 
belief should be negative or non-significant.  If secure attachment style predicts 
conspiracy belief, then both beta weights should be negative (Fraley, 2012).   
2. Study 1 
In Study 1, we measured belief in conspiracy theories, RWA, SDO, 
interpersonal trust, Manichean worldview, age, education level and religiosity.  
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants and design 
Two hundred and fifty-two workers from $PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUN
(Mturk) were recruited to complete an online questionnaire.  Participants were timed 
and those who rushed through the questionnaire or did not complete it properly (e.g., by 
selecting the same response for every question) were excluded from the study (n = 6).  
The remaining participants (N = 246; 145 men, 99 women, 2 transgender, Mage = 34.22 
years, SDage = 10.07) were included in the final analyses.  Of this sample, 89% were 
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American, 6.1% were Indian, and the remaining 4.9% were from various countries.1  
They were each paid US $1 for their time.  The design of the study was correlational.  
The predictor variables were anxious and avoidant attachment, RWA, SDO, 
interpersonal trust, Manichean worldview, and demographic factors (age, education 
level, and religiosity).  The dependent variable was the tendency to believe in 
conspiracy theories. 
2.1.2. Materials and procedure 
The questionnaire was designed and administered using the Qualtrics 
questionnaire design software.  Participants were presented with an information page 
where they were asked to give their informed consent.  They were then asked to 
complete a series of measures in random order, except for the demographic measures 
which always appeared in the same order at the end of the questionnaire.   
2.1.2.1. Belief in conspiracy theories 
We used %URWKHUWRQ)UHQFKDQG3LFNHULQJ¶V*HQHULF&RQVSLUDFLVW
Beliefs scale (GCB)7KHUHZHUHVWDWHPHQWVHJ³&HUWDLQVLJQLILFDQWHYHQWVKDYH
been the result of the activity of a VPDOOJURXSZKRVHFUHWO\PDQLSXODWHZRUOGHYHQWV´
= definitely not true, 5 = definitely true, Į ). 
2.1.2.2. Attachment styles 
We used the Experiences in Close Relationships-Revised (ECR-R) scale 
(Fraley, Waller & Brennan, 2000).  This is a 36-item scale comprised of 18 anxious 
DWWDFKPHQWLWHPVHJ³,¶PDIUDLGWKDW,ZLOOORVHP\SDUWQHU¶VORYH´Į DQG
DYRLGDQWDWWDFKPHQWLWHPV³,JHWXQFRPIRUWDEOHZKHQDURPDQWLFSDUWQHUZDQWVWREH
YHU\FORVH´Į ).  Items are scored on a seven-point scale, where higher scores 
                                                          
1Belarus, Canada, Chile, Italy, Lebanon, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela. 
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indicate a higher level of anxious and avoidant attachment (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree).  Low levels on both subscales indicate secure attachment.  
2.1.2.3. Right-wing attitudes 
We used a shortened version of the Authoritarianism±Conservatism±
Traditionalism (ACT) scale (Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss & Heled, 2010).  There were 12 
VWDWHPHQWVHJ³:KDWRXUFRXQWU\QHHGVPRVWLVGLVFLSOLQHZLWKHYHU\RQHIROORZLQJ
RXUOHDGHUVLQXQLW\´, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree, Į .  Higher scores 
indicate a higher level of right-wing authoritarianism.  To measure SDO, we used the 
Social Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994).  
7KHUHZHUHVWDWHPHQWVHJ³,IFHUWDLQJURXSVRISHRSOHVWDyed in their place, we 
ZRXOGKDYHIHZHUSUREOHPV´1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree, Į = .96).  
Higher scores indicate a higher level of social dominance orientation. 
2.1.2.4. Interpersonal trust 
We used the three-item trust scale Į XVHGby Goerztel (1994).  The items 
asked whether participants felt that they could trust the police, their relatives, or their 
neighbors.  Items are scored on a five-point scale, where higher scores indicate a higher 
level of trust (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). 
2.1.2.5. Manichean worldview 
To measure the Manichean worldview, two items were drawn from Oliver and 
:RRG7KHLWHPVZHUH³3ROLWLFVLVXOWLPDWHO\DVWUXJJOHEHWZHHQJRRGDQG
HYLO´DQG³:HDUHFXUUHQWO\OLYLQJLQ(QG7LPHVDVIoretold by Biblical prophecy´1 = 
GRQ¶WEHOLHYH, 2 = not sure about, 3 = believe, Į ).  Due to poor internal 
consistency only the former item was used to gauge a Manichean worldview in 
subsequent analysesDVLQ2OLYHUDQG:RRG¶VVWXG\. 
ATTACHMENT AND CONSPIRACY BELIEF      14 
 
2.1.2.6. Demographics 
Participants were asked to provide some demographic details.  In addition to age 
and gender, participants were asked to rate their education level (1 = no formal 
education, 2 = primary level education, 3 = secondary level education, 4 = college or 
universLW\OHYHOHGXFDWLRQ>EDFKHORU¶VGHJUHH@, 5 = college or university level education 
[graduate degree]).  Finally, they rated their religiosity (1 = not religious at all, 7 = 
very religious).  After participants completed the questionnaire, they were debriefed, 
thanked and paid for their time. 
2.2. Results and discussion 
We first examined if there was a gender difference in conspiracy belief between 
females and males but no such gender difference existed, t(242) = .43, p = .667.  
Gender was therefore not included as a factor in further analyses.  We also did not 
analyse results for ethnic differences since numbers were too unequal.  All means, 
standard deviations and zero-order correlations can be found in Table 1.  Conspiracy 
belief positively correlated with anxious attachment, SDO, interpersonal trust, and 
Manichean worldview.  RWA did not correlate with conspiracy belief.  Anxious and 
avoidant attachment positively correlated with SDO.  Neither attachment style 
correlated with RWA.  Age negatively correlated with conspiracy belief.  Religiosity 
marginally positively correlated with conspiracy belief. 
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  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Conspiracy 2.55 0.96 1 .24***     .11 .09 .23*** .30*** -.23***   -.15*   -.01    .11 
2. Anxious 2.81 1.41  1   .64*** .02 .33*** .13** -.18** -.19**   -.05   -.01 
3. Avoidant 2.82 1.31   1 -.06 .24***    .02 -.28***   -.09   -.02   -.09 
4. RWA 3.47 0.93    1 .36*** .26*** .36***    .02    .01 .49*** 
5. SDO 2.27 1.28     1 .22***   -.02   -.15*    .03    .13* 
6. Manichean 1.80 0.82      1   -.07   -.09   -.07    .18** 
7. Trust 3.57 0.81       1  .17**   -.01    .13* 
8. Age 34.22 10.07        1    .11    .03 
9. Education 3.65 0.72         1    .10 
10. Religiosity 2.46 1.88          1 
Note. N = 246 
p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlation Matrix (Study 1)
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 To test whether anxious attachment predicts conspiracy belief whilst taking into 
account other known predictors, we loaded all variables into a multiple regression analysis. 
Conspiracy belief was entered as the dependent variable.  Findings of the final model are 
presented in Table 2.  There was no evidence of collinearity (all tolerances > .52 and all VIF 
< 1.9).  The overall regression model was significant, F(9, 236) = 6.87, p < .001 and 
accounted for 21% of variance in conspiracy belief.  As hypothesized, anxious attachment 
significantly predicted conspiracy belief whereas avoidant attachment did not.  SDO, 
interpersonal trust, and Manichean worldview remained significant predictors of conspiracy 
belief.  Therefore anxious attachment appears to be a unique predictor of belief in conspiracy 
theories whereas avoidant attachment does not.  Furthermore, the pattern of coefficients 
suggests that secure attachment is not associated with conspiracy belief.















Table 2  
Predictors of Conspiracy Belief (Study1) 
 
Study 1 demonstrates that belief in conspiracy theories is positively associated with 
anxious attachment, corroborating the findings of Freeman and Bentall (2017).  The results 
also extended existing research by showing that anxious²but not avoidant or secure²
attachment uniquely predicts conspiracy belief when accounting for RWA, SDO, Manichean 
worldview, interpersonal trust, age, education level and religiosity.
Variable t ȕ 
Anxious 2.03 .16* 
Avoidant -1.21 -.10 
RWA 0.19 .02 
SDO 1.99 .13* 
Manichean 3.63  .23** 
Trust -3.56 -.24** 
Age  -0.58 -.04 
Education -1.79  -.11 
Religiosity 1.22 .08 
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3. Study 2 
 In Study 2, we aimed to replicate the relationship between anxious attachment and 
conspiracy belief. 2  We again hypothesized that anxious attachment would predict greater 
conspiracy belief.  We also extended upon our findings from Study 1.  Specifically, we 
included two additional dependent measures²belief in specific conspiracy theories and 
belief in conspiracy theories about particular groups²to examine whether anxious 
attachment predicts belief in only general notions of conspiracy or also established 
conspiracy theories  Finally, we controlled for age, education and religiosity as in Study 1. 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants and design 
Two hundred and thirty one participants were recruited from Prolific Academic to 
take part in a memory recall task.  As in Study 1, participants were timed and those who 
rushed through the questionnaire or did not complete it properly (e.g., by selecting the same 
response for every question) were excluded from the study (n = 1).  Of the remaining 230 
participants (125 women, 105 women, Mage = 38.63 years, SDage = 11.63), 98.7% were 
British and the remaining 1.3% were of various nationalities.3  They were each paid UK 
£1.25 for their time.  The design of the study was correlational.  The predictor variables were 
anxious and avoidant attachment, belief in specific conspiracy theories, belief in conspiracy 
                                                          
2
  This study was originally designed to examine the potential causal link between attachment and conspiracy 
belief.  We reasoned that since anxious attachment predicts conspiracy belief, that priming secure attachment 
may reduce conspiracy belief.  Indeed, previous findings (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001) have shown that secure 
attachment decreases negative attitudes toward others, which is a consistent feature of conspiracy belief. We 
primed secure attachment by asking participants to recall a situation when a significant other was there for them 
and to think about how this person makes them feel (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001, Studies 1 and 3). We also 
included a positive affect condition in which participants were asked to recall a funny situation, and a control 
condition in which participants recalled a visit to the grocery store. Participants completed the attachment 
measure after the manipulation.  Whilst the manipulation check was successful²the secure base task was rated 
as arousing more attachment security feelings (M = 6.12, SD = 1.70) than both the control (M = 3.44, SD = 1.50) 
and the positive affect tasks (M = 4.88, SD = 1.38), F(2, 227) = 79.62, p < .001, Ș2 = .41²there was no effect of 
the manipulation on anxious or avoidant attachment, or any of the measures of conspiracy belief.  We therefore 
decided to treat the study as a correlational study and test the association between attachment styles and 
conspiracy belief.  Research does suggest that conspiracy beliefs are difficult to reduce (Jolley & Douglas, 
2017), so a challenge for future research will be to test ways of priming attachment that influence conspiracy 
belief.   
3
 Bahrain, Trinidad and Tobago, and Tanzania.   
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theories about groups, age, education level and religiosity.  The dependent variable was belief 
in conspiracy theories. 
3.1.2. Materials and procedure 
As in Study 1, the questionnaire was run via Qualtrics software.  Participants were 
first presented with an information page where they were asked to give their informed 
consent.  They were then presented with the questionnaire where the variables below were 
presented in random order, except for the attachment styles and demographic measures, 
which always appeared respectively at the end of the questionnaire. 4 
3.1.2.1. Attachment styles 
Participants completed the ECR-R scale as in Study 1 (Į IRUERWKDQ[LRXVDQG
avoidant attachment).   
3.1.2.2. General conspiracy beliefs 
7RPHDVXUHJHQHUDOFRQVSLUDF\EHOLHIVSDUWLFLSDQWVFRPSOHWHWKH*&%VFDOHĮ 
as in Study 1. 
3.1.2.3. Specific conspiracy beliefs 
To measure conspiracy belief regarding specific events, participants completed 
'RXJODVHWDO¶V VSHFLILFFRQVSLUDF\EHOLHI¶VVFDOH (an abridged version of the scale 
used by Douglas & Sutton, 2011).  This is a seven-item scale measuring belief in conspiracy 
theories about specific events HJ³7KHDWWDFNRQWKH7ZLQ7RZHUVZDVQRWDWHUURULVWDFWLRQ
EXWDJRYHUQPHQWDOSORW´1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; Į  rather than 
general notions of conspiracy.   
3.1.2.4. Conspiracy theories about groups 
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they thought five social groups 
(e.g., bankers, politiciansĮ ) conspired against others (1 = not at all, 6 = very much).  
                                                          
4
 Due to the original experimental design of this study, which employed an attachment priming task, attachment 
was measured last and after a distractor task. 
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3.1.2.5. Demographics 
Finally, participants were asked to indicate their age, education level and religiosity as 
in Study 1.  After participants completed the questionnaire, they were debriefed, thanked and 
paid for their time. 
3.2. Results and discussion 
We first examined if there was a gender difference in conspiracy belief between 
females and males, but no such gender difference existed, t(228) = -.14, p = .890.  Gender 
was therefore not included as a factor in further analyses. We also did not analyse results for 
ethnic differences since numbers were too unequal.  All means, standard deviations and zero-
order correlations can be found in Table 3.  General, specific and group-specific conspiracy 
beliefs were all positively correlated with each other.  General and group-specific conspiracy 
beliefs positively correlated with anxious attachment.  Specific conspiracy beliefs were 
marginally correlated with anxious attachment.  Neither measure of conspiracy belief 
correlated with avoidant attachment.  Education level negatively correlated with general and 
specific conspiracy belief.  Education marginally correlated with group-specific conspiracy 
belief.  Religiosity negatively correlated with both anxious and avoidant attachment. 
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 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. 1.         General Conspiracy 2.57 0.92 1 .82*** .46*** .23*** .01 -.03 -.16* -.10 
2. Specific Conspiracy 2.60 1.38  1 .31***  .12   -.04 .01 -.23*** .12 
3. Group Conspiracy  3.34 1.05   1 .22***    .06 -.07 -.12 -.09 
4. Anxious 3.02 1.25    1  .43*** -.12 -.01 -.14* 
5. Avoidant 2.86 1.18     1 .01 -.03 -.22*** 
6. Age 38.63 11.63      1 -.11 .04 
7. Education 3.80 0.73       1 .04 
1. 8.         Religiosity  1.97 1.46        1 
Note. N = 230 
p < .10, *p < .05, **p <.01, ***p < .001. 
Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix for Study 2 
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To test whether attachment styles could uniquely predict general, specific and group 
conspiracy belief, we loaded all variables into three separate multiple regression analyses.  
Findings of the three final models are presented in Table 4.  There was no evidence of 
collinearity (all tolerances > .76 and all VIF < 1.3).  Firstly, general conspiracy belief was 
entered as the dependent variable.  The overall regression model was significant, F(5, 224) = 
4.99, p < .001 and accounted for 10% of variance in general conspiracy belief.  As in Study 1, 
anxious attachment significantly predicted a general belief in conspiracy theories whereas 
avoidant attachment did not.  The pattern of coefficients also suggests that secure attachment 
did not predict general conspiracy belief. 
Secondly, belief in specific conspiracy theories was entered as the dependent variable.  
The overall regression model was significant, F(5, 224) = 4.59, p < .001 and accounted for 
9% of variance in general conspiracy belief.  Anxious attachment significantly predicted 
belief in specific conspiracy theories whereas avoidant attachment did not.  The pattern of 
coefficients also suggests that secure attachment did not predict conspiracy belief. 
Lastly, belief in conspiracy theories about specific groups was entered as the 
dependent variable.  The overall regression model was significant, F(5, 224) = 4.01, p < .01 
and accounted for 8% of variance in general conspiracy belief.  As in Study 1, anxious 
attachment significantly predicted belief in conspiracy theories whereas avoidant attachment 
did not.  The pattern of coefficients also suggests that secure attachment did not predict 
conspiracy belief.
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 General Specific Group 
Variables t ȕ t ȕ t ȕ 
Anxious 3.88     .27*** 2.46     .18* 3.25       .23*** 
Avoidant -1.14      -.08 -1.21 -.09 -0.17 -.01 
Age -0.31       .02 -0.01 .00 -0.92 -.06 
Education -2.52      -.16* -3.59     -.23*** -2.04 -.13* 
Religiosity 2.03       .13* 2.09    .14* 1.99  .13* 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001. 
Table 4 
Predictors of General, specific, and Group Conspiracy belief (Study 2).
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4. General discussion 
4.1. The present findings 
The current research supported the hypothesis that anxious attachment predicts belief 
in conspiracy theories, and that this relationship holds even when accounting for other known 
predictors of conspiracy belief.  The present research therefore extends the finding that 
insecure attachment and conspiracy beliefs are positively correlated (Freeman & Bentall, 
2017), and specifically suggests that anxious attachment is the key predictor.  Furthermore, 
this research OHQGVVXSSRUWWR'RXJODVHWDO¶V (2017) argument that conspiracy beliefs may be 
used as a mechanism to address important psychological needs.  In this case, conspiracy 
theories may be adopted to meet the psychological need to feel secure.  Furthermore, the 
present research incorporates the social phenomenon of conspiracy beliefs into the wider 
theoretical framework of attachment theory.  Specifically, since attachment remains 
moderately stable from childhood to adulthood (Fraley, 2002), the current results might 
suggest that conspiracy beliefs²in part²result from early childhood attachment experiences.  
This finding also adds to a growing body of literature suggesting that attachment not only 
influences how a person interacts with others, but also that it influences SHRSOH¶Vworldviews 
and political attitudes (e.g., Koleva & Rip, 2009).  
 Importantly, the current research also demonstrates that anxious attachment predicts 
general conspiracy beliefs but also conspiracy beliefs about specific events and groups.  
These results parallel the finding that individuals with anxious attachment tend to exaggerate 
and catastrophize the threats that they may be facing (Cassidy & Berlin, 1994; Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2003).  Individuals high in anxious attachment who endorse different types of 
conspiracy theories may be doing so to make their vulnerabilities known in the hope of 
attracting the attention of attachment figures.   
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 More specifically, after encountering a threat to ones sense of security (e.g., a terrorist 
attack) individuals are motivated to seek proximity to significant others to alleviate distress 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).  Securely attached individuals tend to deal better with such 
threats and tend to seek instrumental and emotional support from significant others (Florian, 
Mikulincer, & Bucholtz, 1995).  In contrast, for individuals with insecure (i.e., avoidant and 
anxious) attachment, significant others are either not available or are inconsistently available.   
These individuals therefore employ secondary strategies to deal with the threat (Cassidy & 
Kobak, 1988).  In this case, individuals with avoidant attachment²for whom significant 
others are not available²would tend to deactivate the attachment system and be more 
inclined to deny stress or vulnerability.  Arguably therefore, they would be less inclined 
toward overarching conspiracy narratives that imply vulnerability and powerlessness.  
Individuals with anxious attachment, however²for whom significant others are 
inconsistently available²would tend to hyperactivate the attachment system and be more 
inclined to express their vulnerabilities in an attempt to attract the attention of significant 
others.  One way this could be achieved is by exaggerating the threat, in the form of elaborate 
conspiracy theories.   Belief in conspiracy theories may therefore²in part²be a 
hyperactivating strategy of the attachment system. 
4.2 Limitations and future research 
 One important limitation of the current research is that it is correlational in nature.  
Thus, we cannot establish the causal direction of the relationship between anxious attachment 
and conspiracy belief.  Nevertheless, we established the relationship across two samples from 
predominantly two different nations, which suggests that the relationship is robust at least in 
Western samples.  Future research could sample from other cultural settings and also 
investigate the direction of causality to draw firmer conclusions about the relationship 
between attachment and conspiracy belief.  In particular, it would be worthwhile further 
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investigating the utility of priming secure attachment as a means to reduce conspiracy belief.  
We know that conspiracy theories can be harmful (Douglas & Leite, 2017; Jolley & Douglas, 
2014 a, b), but that conspiracy beliefs may be difficult to defuse once they have taken root 
(Jolley & Douglas, 2017).  Therefore, potential interventions should take some priority for 
researchers in this area.   
 Further, if contextual activation of attachment security cannot reduce conspiracy 
belief, perhaps individuals with dispositional attachment security might be more resistant to 
conspiracy theories.  Future research should examine whether individuals with secure 
attachment can buffer the effects of perceived loss of control or threats to security on 
conspiracy belief.  Considering that individuals with secure attachment buffer the effects of a 
mortality salience manipulation (Weise et al., 2008), then perhaps only individuals with 
insecure attachment will report greater conspiracy belief after a threat.  Another way in which 
the causal effect of attachment styles could be examined is by running longitudinal studies.  
Specifically, future research might explore the relationship between attachment and 
conspiracy belief over time. 
Finally, considering that attachment styles predict different ways of coping 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007), future research could examine the relationship between 
anxious attachment and conspiracy belief with coping strategies acting as mediators.  
Insecure attachment increases the likelihood of utilizing maladaptive coping strategies to deal 
with threats to security which, in turn, could increase the likelihood of endorsing conspiracy 
theories.  Specifically, future research should examine potential variables that make 
insecurely attached individuals more²or less²likely endorse a conspiracy narrative. 
4.3. Conclusion 
 Considering the potentially negative impact of conspiracy theories for individuals and 
society, it is important to understand why such theories are appealing to so many people.  The 
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current research suggests that anxiously attached individuals might turn to conspiracy 
theories in an attempt to satisfy their unfulfilled need for security.  A future challenge for 
researchers will be to determine if this strategy actually works.   
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